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ŽĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ůĂƐƐŝĐƐĂŶĚƌĐŚĂĞŽůŽŐǇ ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚ ? ?:ĂŶĞK ?EĞŝůů ?^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?





/Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ? ǁĞƐĞƚŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ŝƚŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ Ă  ‘ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ŽĨ Ă ůĂǁ ? ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
through the example of the Abortion Act (1967), an important statute that has regulated a highly 
controversial field of practice for five decades.  Biography is taken as a useful shorthand for an 
approach which requires simultaneous attention to continuity and change in the historical study of a 
law ?ƐůŝĨĞ ?/ƚƚĂŬĞƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƚŚĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŶŽƌŵƐĂƌĞƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?ĞŶƐŚƌŝŶŝŶŐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
set of historically contingent values and practices, yet that  W as linguistic structures that can impact on 
the world only through acts of interpretation  W they are simultaneously constantly evolving. It 
acknowledges the complex, ongoing co-constitution of law and the contexts within which it operates, 
recognising that understanding how law works requires historical, empirical study. Finally, it suggests 
that consideration of a law can offer a unique window through which to explore these broader 





We benefitted greatly from early conversations about a biographical approach to law with Emilie 
Cloatre, David Nelken and Geoffrey Samuel; and from feedback on earlier drafts of this paper from 
John Coggon, Dave Cowan, Sheelagh McGuinness, Jesse Olszynko-Gryn, David Sugarman and two 
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Every law has a biography.  The Abortion Act (1967), which last year reached its fiftieth anniversary, 
offers a good subject to illustrate this claim.  Following a conception in decades of political struggle,1 
the Act was born at the height of the sexual revolution as part of a raft of liberalising legislation.2  It 
has been lauded as a key event in the liberation of women,3 and  ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĞƐƚ ? most humane and 
far-ƐŝŐŚƚĞĚƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?;4 and lambasted aƐĂƚƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ‘ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
the very ďĂƐŝƐŽĨŽƵƌŵŽƌƚĂůĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?5 and symptomatic of all that has gone wrong with Britain.6 
While controversy, often fuelled by activists and lobby groups persists, fifty years on the Act has 
achieved a venerable status as one of the oldest pieces of statute law to govern an area of modern 
medical practice.7  It has survived dozens of attacks in Parliament and been amended only once.8  
While its text has endured largely without alteration, however, its legal and broader cultural meanings 
have evolved considerably over the last five decades. 
While the study of legal biography is evolving in interesting and radical ways,9 it has thus far focused 
almost exclusively on human subjects.10  What does it mean to claim that the Abortion Act has a 
biography?   dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŝƐ itself culturally and historically contingent: Hermione Lee, the 
eminent biographer of Woolf and Gaskell, describes it as  ‘Ă ƐŚĂƉĞ-shifting, contradictory, variable 
ĨŽƌŵ ?, lacking hard and fast rules.11  She nonetheless identifies a range of common features of the 
                                                          
 
1 Generally, K Hindell and M Simms, Abortion Law Reformed (Peter Owen, London, 1971). 
 
2 Including the Suicide Act (1961); the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act (1965); the Family Planning Act 
(1967); and the Sexual Offences Act (1967). 
 
3 Letter from Douglas Houghton to David Steel (6 Feb 1990), LSE archive STEEL/B/2/2. 
 
4 Editorial,  ‘>ĞƚƚŚĞĐƚĂĐƚ ? Medical News Tribune, 14 (13 Feb 1970).   
 
5 DDƵŐŐĞƌŝĚŐĞ ? ‘tŚĂƚƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐďŽƵƚ ?Sunday Times (2 February 1975). 
 
6  D Alton, What Kind of Country? (Marshall Pickering, 1988) p.168. 
 
7 The entire statutory framework regulating abortion is contained within the first four of 270 pages of statutes 
extracted in the chronologically ordered AE Morris and MA Jones (eds) ůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚƵƚĞƐŽŶDĞĚŝĐĂů>Ăǁ ?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2007).   
 
8 On the amendments, J DƵƌƉŚǇ ‘ŽƐŵĞƚŝĐƐ ?Eugenics and Ambivalence: the Revision of tŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
(1991) 13(5) JSWFL 375-93.  On early attacks, J Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal 
Regulation of Abortion in England from 1803 to 1982 (Cambridge: CUP, 1988); David Marsh and Joanna 
Chambers Abortion Politics (London: Junction Books, 1981); David Paintin, Abortion Law Reform in Britain (1964-
2003): a Personal Account (London: bpas, 2015), chapter 7. 
 
9 >DƵůĐĂŚǇĂŶĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P>ĞŐĂů>ŝĨĞtƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝǌĞĚ^ƵďũĞĐƚƐĂŶĚ^ŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?
42(1) JLS 1-6. 
 
10 EŽƚĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚƐƚƵĚǇŽĨůĞŐĂůŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ŶƉĂƌƚŽŶ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?D Sugarman (2015) 
 ‘From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing: Broadening Conceptions of Legal History and Socio-legal SchŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?
42(1) JLS 7, 32; A Perry-Kessaris (Guest Editor) Special Issue: The Pop Up Museum of Legal Objects (2017) 68:3 
NILQ. 
 
11 H Lee, Biography: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 18.  
 
genre.  Some  W such as the requirement that the work should, so far as possible, endeavour to be 
objective  W distinguish biography from other kinds of (literary) narrative but would be broadly 
accepted as a necessary goal in any robust legal or historical scholarship.12 Others do not apply 
straightforwardly to the study of a non-human subject.13 However, Lee identifies two typical features 
of biography that offer a useful starting point for the current analysis: first, biography is a form of 
history and, second, it should ĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐǁŚŽůĞůŝĨĞor, at least, life to date.14  While not all 
biographies analyse their subjects from birth to death (or even to full maturity), ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?
nonetheless suggests a historical span, promising more than a snapshot taken at one moment in time. 
It requires the historical, contextual study of a subject that is simultaneously attentive to both 
continuity and change within it over an extended period. This makes a  ‘ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ
a very different exercise from an explanation of the factors which led to its introduction,15 or accounts 
of specific episodes in its life.16   
Scholars have taken this broad insight as a starting point for moving beyond human subjects, offering 
biographies of such diverse objects as archaeological artefacts, diseases, and cities,17 emphasising that 
each cannot be fully understood at just one moment in its existence but, rather, must be examined as 
a continuing and evolving whole, which is always in the process of accumulating meaning.18  When 
applied to a statute, this approach has three major implications.  First, it foregrounds a basic socio-
legal insight: that law is a living thing, which needs to be studied as it is interpreted and takes effect 
in practice, rather than merely as it exists on the statute books.19  Even where ĂƐƚĂƚƵƚĞ ?Ɛ text remains 
unchanged, its acquisition of legal meaning is an ongoing process, which involves interpretative work; 
development and consolidation of received understandings; evolving practices; and moments of 
challenge, rupture, and revision.  Such evolution in meaning inevitably both reflects and influences 
the shifting broader social and institutional contexts within which a law is read, understood and 
                                                          
12 While we all write from a position influenced by history, nationality, race, gender, class, education and beliefs, 
Lee notes that modern biography should nonetheless ďĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĂů ?ůŝĨĞ-
writing of earlier centuries, ibid 12-13. 
 




15 Hindell and Simms, n 1 above, offer a detailed account of the introduction of the Abortion Act.  For other 
important studies of the emergence of legislation, W'ĂƌƐŽŶ ? ‘^ǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚInstrumental Dimensions of Early 
Factory Legislation: a Case Study in the Social Origins of Criminal >Ăǁ ?ŝŶZ,ŽŽĚ ?ĞĚ) Crime, Criminology and 
Public Policy (London: Heinemann, 1974); D Nelken, The Limits of the Legal Process: a Study of Landlords, Law 
and Crime (London, Academic Press 1983).  
 
16 E.g. Marsh and Chambers, n 8 above, offering a detailed explorations of a specific reform attempt. 
 
17 E.g. C Gosden and Y Marshall (1999) 'The Cultural Biography of Objects' 31:2 World Archaeology 169; S 
Mukherjee, The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer (London: Fourth Estate 2011); P Ackroyd, 
London: the Biography (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000). 
 
18 /<ŽƉǇƚŽĨĨ ? ‘dŚĞ Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as PƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ŝŶA Appadurai (ed) The Social Life 
of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: CUP, 1988). 
 
19 For the significance of focusing on  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůĂǁ ?ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ this project, D Cowan and tŝŶĐŽƚƚ ‘ǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ
the Legal ?ŝŶŽǁĂŶĂŶĚtŝŶĐŽƚƚ ?ĞĚƐ ?Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies (London: Palgrave 2015). 
 
applied.  Second, a statute  W and particularly one characterised by considerable controversy  W also 
acquires a broader social and symbolic meaning, which stands in no necessary relationship either to 
the intention of its drafters or to its doctrinal meaning, as developed by lawyers.  The stories told 
about a law  W and what that law represents in broader cultural terms  W can and will evolve, whilst at 
times revealing roots which go deep into its history.  Finally, the subject of a biography can offer a 
window through which to study aspects of the world evolving around it.20  Biography must offer the 
story of the stream as well as that of the fish.21 
A comprehensive account of the ďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ?Ɛlong and complex biography is far beyond the scope 
of this paper.22  Here, in a necessarily brief and highly selective account, we seek to illustrate a few of 
the insights which might be gleaned from a biographical approach by focusing on two episodes 
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ƐƚŝŶŐ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐƚ ?Ɛlife.  A recent Daily Mail investigation into services 
at Marie Stopes International;23 and the Babies for Burning report of the early 1970s,24 each claimed 
to cast a spotlight on how the Abortion Act was working in practice.  Considering them together offers 
useful insights into change and continuity in its meanings. 
 
1) Two episodes in the life of the Abortion Act  
 
The Abortion Act (1967) applies in England, Wales and Scotland but not Northern Ireland.  It carves 
out an exception whereby criminal offences under the law relating to abortion will not be 
committed,25 provided that a pregnancy is terminated under medical control.  Specifically, the 
abortion must be performed on NHS or licensed premises, by a registered medical practitioner, and 
following a good faith opinion that it might be justified under one of several broad grounds set out in 
the Act. 26 
                                                          
20 M Gillings and J Pollard,  ‘Non-Portable Stone Artifacts and Contexts of Meaning ? (1999) 31:2 World 
Archaeology, 179. 
 
21 ĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ ŽĨ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ŚĞƌ ŽǁŶ ŵĞŵŽŝƌ ? tŽŽůĨ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?  ‘/ ƐĞĞ ŵǇƐĞůĨ ĂƐ Ă ĨŝƐŚ ŝŶ Ă ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?
ĚĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ŚĞůĚ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ďƵƚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?  s tŽŽůĨ ?  ‘^ŬĞƚĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WĂƐƚ ?Moments of Being 
(London: Pimlico, 2002), 90. 
 
22 &ŽƌĂĨƵůůĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?'ĂǀŝƐ ?:K ?EĞŝůů ?WĂƌŬĞƌĂŶĚ^^ŚĞůĚŽŶ ?The Abortion Act 1967: a Biography of a UK 
Law (forthcoming, Cambridge: CUP, 2018). 
23 < &ĂƵůŬŶĞƌ ĂŶĚ ^ ^ŵǇƚŚ ?  ‘ďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐSigned off after just a Phonecall: how Marie Stopes Doctors Approve 
Abortions for WŽŵĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞNever MĞƚ ?Daily Mail (6 March 2017).   
 
24 Michael Litchfield and Susan Kentish, Babies for Burning: the Abortion Business in Britain (Serpentine Press 
1974).  At the time of writing, extensive and previously unstudied resources on Babies for Burning were held 
by BPAS, which was named in the investigation and actively involved in rebutting its allegations.  The files are 
now held by the Wellcome Library, which has made some of them publicly available.  References here relate to 
the files as organised in the BPAS holding.   
 
25 Notably, ss58 and 59, Offences Against the Person Act (1861) and the Infant Life Preservation Act (1929) (for 
England and Wales); and common law offences (for Scotland).    
 
26 Abortion Act, s1(1). An exception is made for conditions of emergency, s1(4). 
 
Individual doctors enjoy wide discretion under this provision and, unsurprisingly, they have exercised 
it to different effect. In 1970, some 10% of consultant gynaecologists freely allowed access to abortion; 
6% objected to it in any circumstances; and the rest interpreted the Abortion Act as seemed best to 
ƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĚŝĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ ?27 no doubt representing the full 
spectrum of more permissive and restrictive interpretations beyond these two extremes.  GPs tended 
towards a more liberal reading of the Act, contributing to a significant, immediate increase in referrals 
into the NHS.  One gynaecologist noted ruefully:  
 ‘ĂůůŝŶĂůů ?ǁĞ ?ƚŚĞZK' ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂǀĞƌǇŐƌĞĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
Act. We thought there would be a slightly more liberal attitude to the problem, for that, after all, was 
ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁůĂǁ ?,ŽǁǁƌŽŶŐǁĞǁĞƌĞ ? ?28
The rate of legal abortions rose sharply after the introduction of the Act. While 2,800 legal 
terminations were reported in the whole of 1962, almost 10,000 were performed in the fourth quarter 
of 1968 alone.29  Numbers continued to increase rapidly over subsequent years, reaching 167,149 in 
1973 for England and Wales alone, before declining slightly over subsequent years.30  With Britain at 
the international vanguard of liberalising legislation, particular concern was provoked by the fact that 
26,897 of these were  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƵƌŝƐƚƐ ?, seeking to avoid more restrictive laws elsewhere.31 The 
immediate impact within the NHS, where no additional resources had been made available to cope 
with increased demand, was dramatic.  While the rise in legal abortions was accompanied by a decline 
in sepsis cases resulting from the decline in illegal ones, it was practically difficult to redeploy the beds 
thus freed.32  In the face of rapidly growing waiting lists for other routine gynaecological procedures, 
doctors came under pressure to refuse women seeking abortion or to accept them only from within a 
given catchment area.33  This exacerbated a marked disparity in the availability of NHS services, with 
80% of abortions in Newcastle but less than 40% in Birmingham funded by the NHS in 1970.34  Private 
and charitable abortion services, with negligible refusal rates, quickly developed in regions where NHS 
services were limited.   The British Pregnancy Advisory Service was initially established as the 
                                                          
27 TRT Lewis (1970)  ‘dŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? P&ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨĂŶ /ŶƋƵŝƌǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚzĞĂƌ ?ƐtŽƌŬŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞĐƚ
conduĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞZK' ? ?D: ? ? ?-35. 
 
28 TRT Lewis (1969)  ‘The Abortion Act ? ? P ? ? ? ? BMJ (Jan 25, 1969) 241, p 241. 
 
29 Lewis, ibid. 
 
30 ZĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐ ?^ƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚŽŶďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
31 Report of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act  ?ƚŚĞ ‘>ĂŶĞZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ŵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?, 
[457- ? ? ? ? ‘ďŽƌƚŝŽŶƚŽƵƌŝƐŵ ?ĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚƌĂƉŝĚůǇĂƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞh<ŝŶůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ
laws. 
 
32 A Hordern, Legal Abortion: the English Experience (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971), chapter 8.   There 
insufficient data to trace a corresponding decrease in illegal abortion, D^ŝŵŵƐ ? ‘ďŽƌƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁZĞĨŽƌŵ P,ŽǁƚŚĞ
ŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝŵ>Z ? ? ? ?:D&ŝŶŶŝƐ ? ‘dŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ PtŚĂƚ,ĂƐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝŵ>ZĞǀ
3. 
 
33 82,787 gynaecology patients were awaiting non-urgent NHS operations in December 1968, at a time when 
only 436 FTE of consultant gynaecologists worked in England and Wales, Hordern, ibid, 105.   
 
34 Lane, n 31 above [43].   
 
Birmingham Pregnancy Advisory Service, with the aim of addressing specific problems in local service 
provision.35  
While reducing maternal mortality and morbidity,36 the early years of the Abortion Act were also 
marked by incidents of serious abuse.  Some exploited the greater freedom offered by the Act, 
 ‘ďĂƚƚĞŶŝŶŐŽŶŚĂƌĚ-ƵƉŐŝƌůƐ ? to offer  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĐĂƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵƵŵŽĨ
ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?37  Later abortions emerged as a focus of particular controversy, with regular  ‘ŚŽƌƌŽƌstories ? 
reported of live aborted fetuses left to die without basic care.38  An early report went further still, 
claiming that whole live fetuses were being sold for use in research.39  While ultimately shown to be 
unfounded or misleading, each of these initial reports gained far more attention than the subsequent 
investigations disproving their claims.40   
The Government responded with the establishment of two review bodies.  The first focused on the 
use of fetal remains in research,41 producing a Code of Practice, which was adopted across the sector.42  
The second, the Lane Committee, conducted an extensive, three year investigation into the workings 
of the Act.  It found clear evidence of a small number of  ‘commercial entrepreneurs ? who exploited 
vulnerable women, engaging in extensive advertising and touting for, and even  ‘hi-jackŝŶŐ ? ? women 
from train stations and airports.43   While evidence of such abuses had led to calls for the Abortion Act 
to be amended, Lane rejected this conclusion,44 suggesting rather that such abuses might be 
addressed through more robust regulation.  These recommendations were broadly endorsed by a 
Select Committee and followed by the Government.45  The use of regulation here emerged as an 
                                                          
35 Paintin, n 8 above, chapter 5. 
 
36 D Steel, HC Deb Vol 885 Cols 1764-7 (7 Feb 1975) lists ƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ ?^ĞĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?
Lane, n 31 above, [507].  
 
37 ĞǀůŝŶ ? ‘/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞAbortion LĂǁƐ ? ?General Practitioner (1 Nov 1974).   
 
38 BPAS (undated) The Foetus Myth ?ŐĂƚŚĞƌƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽĨ ‘ĂƐƚĞĂĚǇƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨŚŽƌƌŽƌƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?
dating from 1970-1979.  BPAS uncatalogued. 
 
39 ǀĞŶŝŶŐEĞǁƐZĞƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ? ‘ ?hŶďŽƌŶĂďŝĞƐ&Žƌ^ĂůĞ ? W ŶŐĞƌ&ůĂƌĞƐ ?Evening News (16 May 1970); N St. John-
^ƚĞǀĂƐ ? ‘dŚĞ^ĐĂŶĚĂůŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽĞƚƵƐĞƐ ?Catholic Herald (22 May 1970). 
 
40 An anonymous introduction to BPAS, n 38 above, ŶŽƚĞƐ ‘ǁŚĞŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ
to be untrue or distorted or inaccurate, the publicity given to the correct versions has been very much less  W and 
ǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ? ?Lane, n 31 ĂďŽǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŐŝǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂŶǆŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞ ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ 
but ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĂŶǇĐĂƐĞŽĨĂĨĞƚƵƐŽĨůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?ǁĞĞŬƐ ?ŐĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞŝŶŐǀŝĂďůĞ ? 
 
41 The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research: Report of the Advisory Group (the  ‘WĞĞůZĞƉŽƌƚ ?) (London: 
HMSO, 1972). 
 
42 DHSS Circular, ŽĚĞŽĨWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĨŽƌ&ĞƚĂůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ PZĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ^ŝƌ:ŽŚŶWĞĞů ?ƐĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ'ƌŽƵƉ (23 
May 1972), no. 72/154: Wellcome SA/ALR/G.8.   
 




45 Barbara Castle, Secretary of State for Social Services, HC Debs Vol 898 Col 244-7 (21 October 1975), describing 
the resulting changes in regulation. 
important means of seeking to address concerns regarding the operation of the Act, in a way which 
avoided allowing Parliament the opportunity to amend it,46 a role which it has continued to play.     
In 1974, shortly before Lane was due to report and with controversy regarding the Act at its peak, a 
storm erupted around allegations made by two freelance journalists in a series of reports in the News 
of the World under the banner, Phantom Babies,47 and later a book, Babies for Burning.48  Michael 
Litchfield and Susan Kentish promised:  
 ‘ĂƚĞƌƌŝĨǇŝŶŐůǇƐƚĂƌŬĂŶĚŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚǁŽƉĞŽƉůe probing every facet of the private sector of the 
abortion industry.  One harrowing experience after another is assimilated into a disturbing dossier that 
should make even the most hardened pro-abortionists re-examine their dogma.  Phantom pregnancies, 
girls-for-hire by a doctor as baby-ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ‘ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐ ? ?ďĂďŝĞƐƐŽůĚƚŽĐŽƐŵĞƚŝĐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŽďĞĐŚƵƌŶĞĚ
into soap, are but a few of the macabre and grisly features of this important but chilling social 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ?49 
 
Posing as a couple facing an unwanted pregnancy, Litchfield and Kentish had visited a range of 
pregnancy testing services, doctors ?ƐƵƌŐĞƌŝĞƐ ? and abortion clinics, apparently uncovering a horrific 
level of abuse. They carried with them a concealed tape recorder, allowing them to promise that 
 ‘ ?Ğ ?ǀĞƌǇ ĨĂĐƚ ǁĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƉƌŽǀĞ ? ?50  However, after some months, it became apparent that 
recordings of the most shocking incidents which they described  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďĂďŝĞƐƚŽďĞ
ĐŚƵƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŽƐŽĂƉ ? ?were unavailable or inaudible.51  A Sunday Times investigation exposed the falsity 
and lack of corroboration of many of the stories told in the book.  A number of parties sued for 
defamation.52 Babies for Burning ?Ɛ publisher was liquidated;53 its authors bankrupted.54   
 
                                                          
 
46 The then Health Minister has described his reluctance to allow Parliament to vote again on abortion law 
reform and the role played by regulation in staving off this possibility. David Owen, Time to Declare (London, 
Michael Joseph, 1991), 229.   
47 The reports were trailed on 24 February 1974, appearing over the three following weeks.   
 
48 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above.   
 
49 Ibid, back cover. 
 
50 Ibid, 11-12. 
 
51 Minutes of Evidence, House of Commons Select Committee on the Abortion Amendment Bill (7 July 1975), 
[1282-1294], [1301]. 
 
52 Lafitte and ors v Serpentine Press and ors, QBD, apology read in open court (26 January 1978); Pond v News 
Group Newspapers QBD (11 July 1980), unreported; Pond v Litchfield and Kentish QBD (8 December 1982) 
unreported; Bloom v Litchfield, Kentish and others, QBD (7-8 March 1977) unreported. Extensive documentation 
relating to each action was held in the BPAS archive.  dŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞSunday Times was 
withdrawn. 
 
53 sĂƌŝŽƵƐƉĂƉĞƌƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽ^ĞƌƉĞŶƚŝŶĞ ?ƐůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?W^ ?Pocket Folder 2. 
 
54 ^ ƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨĞďƚŽƌ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨĨĂŝƌƐfor Kentish (4 August 1981) and Litchfield (19 February 1982).  BPAS, 
Misc 1. 
 
While the precise impact of this investigation is impossible to gauge, it was certainly significant.  It was 
reported across the News of the World ?Ɛ front pages for four weeks, at a time when it was thĞ ‘tŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ
>ĂƌŐĞƐƚ^ƵŶĚĂǇ^ĂůĞ ?,55 reporting a circulation of 5.5 million.56  Several early reviews reproduced the 
ďŽŽŬ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐƵŶĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?57 and one commentator noted that it ǁĂƐ  ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů
ŵĞĚŝĐĂůďŽŽŬŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝƚƐĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐĂůůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?58 Babies 
for Burning was republished in at least four languages and quickly became ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘bible of 
the pro-ůŝĨĞ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?.59 Litchfield addressed large Pro-Life rallies;60 and the authors were 
interviewed on national radio.61   
 
The investigation had a clear impact on early attempts to restrict the Abortion Act.62  One MP is said 
to have based his personal research for his 1975 abortion bill on reading the proofs,63 and others 
explicitly attributed their support for it to the book.64  Litchfield and Kentish were invited to give 
evidence to an important Parliamentary Select Committee,65 which in turn influenced further 
measures aiming to restrict the Act.66  However, the public unravelling of the book ?Ɛ more extreme 
claims may equally have militated against reform: with its most shocking claims ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚĂƐ ‘ĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐ ?,
any truth in its more credible allegations may also have been treated with a large grain of salt.67    
 
While it was without doubt the most important scandal to have engulfed the Abortion Act, more than 
forty years on, Babies for Burning has been largely forgotten.  Currently, around 200,000 abortions 
are performed each year within the now well-embedded regulatory framework established by the 
                                                          
55 News of the World, front cover (3 March 1974). 
 
56 Kentish, Bloom above n 52, cross-examination of Mrs Susan Kentish, transcript at 7, BPAS Misc 2. 
 
57 ZƵƚƚ ? ‘dŚŝƐAwful Silence Hanging over Abortion oŶĞŵĂŶĚ ? ?Times (23 January 1975); >ďƐĞ ? ‘>ĞŽďƐĞDW
on the Murder Trade of tŚĞ>ŽŶĚŽŶďŽƌƚŝŽŶůŝŶŝĐƐ ?Spectator (18 January 1975); Muggeridge n 5 above.   
 
58 ĞǀůŝŶ ? ‘ŽŽŬĨŽƌƵƌŶŝŶŐ ? ?The General Practitioner (20 January 1978).  
 
59 F Lafitte, affidavit in Lafitte and ors n 52 above, BPAS, Evidence 4. 
 
60 The World this Weekend BBC Radio 4 (28 April 1974) transcript on file, BPAS, Pocket Folder 2 reported that 
>ŝƚĐŚĨŝĞůĚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐĂ ‘ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƵďůŝĐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ,ǇĚĞWĂƌŬ. 
  
61 E.g. Ibid and The Jimmy Young Show, BBC Radio 2 (27 December 1974), transcript, BPAS, Pocket Folder 2. 
 
62 Generally, Marsh and Chambers, n 8 above, 27-8. 
 
63 James White MP, interviewed in the Scottish Daily Record (5 December 1975). 
 
64 Marsh and Chambers, n 8 above.   
 
65 Select Committee, n 51 above. 
 
66 Marsh and Chambers, n 8 above. 
 
67 The W^ WƵďůŝĐ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P   ‘ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĚŽƵďƚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ  “ĂďŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƵƌŶŝŶŐ ?
completely undermined, the credibility of much of the anti-ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶůŽďďǇ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ ? ?
DƵŶĚĂǇ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?, ŽŽŬĨŽƌĂŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ P ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂů^ƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?W^EĞǁƐůĞƚƚĞƌ&Ğď ? ? ?BPAS Unnamed 
1, 1. 
 
Abortion Act.68  Almost all terminations performed in Scotland are performed within the NHS.  For 
England and Wales, around one third of abortions are performed within NHS facilities, with the 
remainder largely provided by two large charities operating under NHS contract: the British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service (bpas), which has now expanded far beyond its initial base in Birmingham, and Marie 
Stopes International (MSI).69  However, criticism of the Abortion Act has persisted, with its operation 
scrutinised through the ongoing use of medŝĂ ‘ƐƚŝŶŐƐ ?, which have become a significant and recurrent 
feature of its life.    
Most recently, a Daily Mail investigation followed up on the findings of a Care Quality Commission 
(CQC) inspection of MSI.70  The CQC had identified a string of flaws in service provision ranging from 
basic failures in governance, clinical care and safeguarding, to criticism of how the approval 
requirements under the Abortion Act were met, with doctors seen bulk signing abortion certificates.71  
The Mail investigation was far more limited than Babies for Burning in its scope.  It reported some of 
the CQC ?Ɛ concerns and described how Mail journalists were able to access services on the basis of a 
brief conversation with a call centre worker.72   While the CQC inspection report was widely reported 
by the national press, the Mail sting received relatively little coverage in other mainstream media.  
However, it nonetheless offers a useful point of comparison to Babies for Burning.   Below we consider 
a central concern in each  ‘ƐƚŝŶŐ ?: ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? gatekeeper role in access to abortion services.  A closer 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƐ ?ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐƚ ?ƐůŽŶŐůŝĨĞ ?ƐƵŐŐests significant 
continuity but also evolution in how the Act is interpreted and in the broader stories told about it.  It 
is in requiring our simultaneous attention to such change and continuity that the biographical 
approach may prove illuminating. 
 
2) Continuity and change in legal meaning 
 
The passage of a statute through Parliament marks only the beginning of its existence.  After being 
signed into law, it becomes subject to the industry of lawyers and others, who go to work on how it is 
to be interpreted.73 Those whose activities are affected will consider how best to apply it, sometimes 
translating it into professional codes or internal policy and procedure documents, sometimes flouting 
it or pushing at its perceived limits and potentially expanding or contracting them through their 
interpretation of the text.  A law can sometimes be ignored, languishing on the statute books despite 
being disregarded.74  It can operate as a more or less important part of the background to the norms 
                                                          
68 Department of Health, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2016 (June 2017); ISD, Termination of 




70 CQC, Marie Stopes International: Quality Report (20 December 2016). 
 
71 Clinicians were seen signing piles of 30- ? ?ĨŽƌŵƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨũƵƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
noted on the back, without necessarily having access to all patient information.  Ibid, 36. 
 
72 Faulkner and Smyth, n 23 above. 
 
73 R Cotterell, The Sociology of Law: an Introduction (2nd edition, London Butterworths, 1992), 1. 
 
74 For some interesting (including some apocryphal) examples, see Law Commission, Legal Curiosities: Fact or 
Fable? http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Legal_Oddities.pdf.  
 
informing daily life, offering a last resort when all other efforts to resolve a dispute have failed, with a 
limited or only indirect impact on day to day life.75 Alternatively, it can have an influence that goes far 
beyond that foreseen by its drafters or justified by its wording.76 Even when a dispute comes to court, 
judges enjoy considerable discretion in the interpretation of statutory norms, with the mere fact of 
judicial division on a particular question itself indicating the inherent openness and indeterminacy of 
law. While such a position is fiercely contested, some have gone so far as to argue that the existing 
body of legal doctrines permits a judge to justify any result he or she desires in any particular case.77   
Relatively few cases regarding the Abortion Act have been considered by the courts, with still fewer 
reaching the Supreme Court or its predecessor, the House of Lords.78  However, before turning to the 
focus on clinical decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽ ‘ƐƚŝŶŐƐ ?discussed above, it is worth offering 
one of these cases as a brief illustration of how legal meaning can be created by courts.  RCN (1981) 
turned upon the role of nurses and midwives in abortion procedures.  While in 1967, doctors had 
performed abortions using surgical techniques, by the early 1980s many second trimester abortions 
were carried out using drugs to provoke uterine contractions, a process which might last anything up 
to 18-30 hours.79  In these procedures, it was common practice for a doctor to insert a catheter into 
the woman and then to remain available on call, while all steps directly causative of the abortion were 
carried out by a nurse or midwife. While the legality of this practice was confirmed in official 
guidance,80 the Royal College of Nursing queried whether it might properly be considered to fall within 
the requirement under the Act that a pregnancy must be  ‘ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ ŵĞĚŝĐĂů
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?.81   
                                                          
75 ZWŽƵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘>ĂǁŝŶŽŽŬƐĂŶĚ>ĂǁŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? American Law Review 12. 
 
76 Some interviewees in an Irish study were reluctant to speak about abortion law reform, wrongly believing 
even this was illegal under laws restricting the provision of information regarding abortion services.  Amnesty 
International, She is not a Criminal: tŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐďŽƌƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁƐ (London: AI 2015). 
 
77 For critical discussion of this approach, typically associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, LB Solum 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘KŶƚŚĞ/ŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇƌŝƐŝƐ PƌŝƚŝƋƵŝŶŐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽŐŵĂ ? ? ?University of Chicago Law Review, 462.  For a 
careful and nuanced exploration of the scope available to judges in statutory interpretation and the constraints 
upon their reasoning, N Duxbury Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2012), particularly Part III; 
and The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 
78 RCN v DHSS [1981] 1 All ER 545; Janaway v Salford HA [1988] 3 All ER 1079; Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
 
79 RCN, ibid. 
 
80 Letter to doctors and nursing officers from Dame Phyllis Friend (CNO) and H Yellowlees (CMO), 21 February 
1980, RCOG/A/16/19. 
 
81 RCN, n 78 above. 
 
The  ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ the Abortion Act was unclear on this point,82 ǁŝƚŚ ĂŵƉůĞ  ‘ƌŽŽŵ ĨŽƌ ƚǁŽ
ǀŝĞǁƐ ?83 and judges divided between them.84  However, a slim majority in the House of Lords ultimately 
concluded that the provision was best understood as meaning that a doctor  ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ
responsibility ? for all stages of an abortion, without necessarily needing to carry out specific actions 
him or herself.85  Importantly, while the meaning of the Act is here laid down by the courts, heavy 
reliance is placed on understandings which had already been developed in clinical settings.  The judges 
noted a reluctance to disrupt safe, effective established medical practice,86 avoiding the potential 
consequence of a narrower reading of this provision: that some 8,500 women each year might either 
face abortions performed by more dangerous surgical methods or be refused NHS treatment 
altogether.87  
Both Babies for Burning and the Mail investigation focused heavily on the acquisition of meaning of 
another important requirement laid down in the Abortion Act: that two doctors must form a good 
faith opinion that a termination may be justified in line with one of the broad grounds laid down within 
it. From the outset, a large majority of abortions were authorised on the basis of the first such ground: 
that  ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƌŝƐŬ ?ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝĨƚŚĞƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇǁĞƌĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ?
of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, ?88 
with doctors able to ƚĂŬĞ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞŐŶĂŶƚ ǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ  ‘actual or reasonably foreseeable 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? in reaching their decision.89  While this wording left considerable scope for clinical 
discretion,90 it had not been intended ďǇƚŚĞĐƚ ?ƐƐƉŽŶƐŽƌ that it should  ‘leave a wide open door for 
abortion on request'.91  However, just as a broad interpretation has given the Act a meaning capable 
of accommodating technical developments in abortion methods, so too has there been clear evolution 
in understandings of appropriate decision-making within the terms of the Act, with existing medical 
practice again offering an important reference point in giving it meaning.92   
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86 Ibid, Lord Roskill, 577; Lord Keith, 575.  Cf Denning MR, 557.   
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90 Generally, Keown, n 8 above, chapter 5. 
 
91. Steel, H.C. Deb Vol. 732, Col. 1075, 1966 (22 July). 
 
92 R v Smith (CA) [1974] 1 ALL ER 376, noting that without evidence as to professional practice and medical 
probabilities, a verdict against a doctor was often likely to be unsafe.     
As noted above, individual clinicians interpreted this provision of the Act differently, with charities and 
private practice developing to offer abortions where NHS services were unavailable. Litchfield and 
Kentish deliberately targeted these non-NHS providers, finding clear evidence that abortion was 
available  ‘ŽŶĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?within some of them.  One service provider had told Kentish that while she 
could obtain ĂŶĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐůŝŶŝĐ ?ƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐƚĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶĞĂƌƚŚůǇĐŚĂŶĐĞ ?within the NHS for, 
after all,  ‘ǁŚĂƚŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶŚĂǀĞǇŽƵŐŽƚƚŽƐĂǇǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŚŝƐĐŚŝůĚ ? ?93  Another emphasised 
that two gynaecologists would make a final decision but advised that  ‘ŝĨǇŽƵĚŝĚŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂ
child at all  W ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?.94  A third reassured her that while she would need to see 
two doctors, all that mattered were the ĐŽƵƉůĞ ?Ɛ  ‘private reasons ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘nothing to do with 
anybody else ?.95  
Litchfield and Kentish ?Ɛ account of their meeting with Dr Philip Bloom, a psychiatrist specialising in 
psycho-sexual problems, offers a particularly revealing insight into how the Abortion Act was 
interpreted and implemented in the early 1970s.  Bloom assessed Kentish in her guise of a married 
woman who simply did not want children.  He operated openly from an address at the heart of the 
medical establishment, requiring moderate payment by the standards of Harley Street. There was no 
suggestion that he had encouraged Kentish to end her (fictitious) pregnancy: he twice checked 
whether she was sure of her decision and once whether she had considered adoption.96 With the 
recording of their interview available, there was little dispute as to facts,97 meaning that the case 
turned squarely on conflicting interpretations of the requirements of the medical gatekeeper role 
foreseen within the Abortion Act.  As the judge summarised ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ũƵƌǇ ŝŶ ůŽŽŵ ?Ɛ 
subsequent defamation action: hĂĚůŽŽŵŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇĨŽƌŵĞĚŽŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?ŽƌƌĂƚŚĞƌĂ ‘ƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐ ?ĐĂƐƵĂů ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚ ?one?98 
 In the words of the News of the World, Bloom had asked:    
 ‘ “Were you a bed-wetter as a child?  Occasional depression sometimes?  Sex side alright?  Do you tend 
ƚŽďĞĂƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚĂƚŚŽŵĞ ? ?  tŚĞŶŚĞĂƐŬĞĚ ? “zŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƐǁŽŽŶŽǀĞƌďĂďŝĞƐ ? ?^ƵĞƌĞƉůŝĞĚ P “EŽ ?/
ŵĞĂŶ/ůŝŬĞŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĂďŝĞƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ ?ƌůŽŽŵƐĂŝĚ P “tĞůů ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞĂŶǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝŶŚaving 
ĂĐŚŝůĚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚ ? ? ? 
Bloom certified the need for an abortion on the basis that Kentish had no maternal feelings and might 
react neurotically to an unwanted pregnancy.99  He complained that while this had been a  ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇ
                                                          
 
93 D>ŝƚĐŚĨŝĞůĚĂŶĚ^<ĞŶƚŝƐŚ ? ‘ďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĂŚĂƵĨĨĞƵƌ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?News of the World (17 March 1974). 
 
94 M Litchfield aŶĚ^<ĞŶƚŝƐŚ ? ‘/ĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ? ?News of the World (17 March 1974). 
 
95 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above, 113. 
 
96 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above, 79-92. 
 
97 Excepting that the News of the World ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ůŽŽŵ ŚĂĚ ĂƐŬĞĚ  ‘ũƵƐƚ  ? ? ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĂƉĞ
recorded over twice that number. Bloom, above n 52.  
 
98 /ďŝĚ ?:ƵĚŐĞ ?ƐƐƵŵŵŝŶŐƵƉ ? ? ? ? 
 
99 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above, p 88. 
 
ŶŽƌŵĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?100 ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽŶĞŵƵƐƚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŚĞŚĂƐĂďĂďǇŽƌ
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂďĂďǇ ?, he had nonetheless been incluĚĞĚŝŶĂ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞƐ ?ŐĂůůĞƌǇ ?ŽĨ ‘Ă
ŵƵůƚŝŵŝůůŝŽŶƉŽƵŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?101   
Litchfield and Kentish robustly defended a very different view, claiming that if Kentish qualified for an 
abortion on the basis of that interview,  ‘then no ǁŽŵĂŶ ŝƐ Ĩŝƚ ƚŽďĞĂƌĂĐŚŝůĚ  ? Q ? ?dŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞ
supposed to establish, regardless of the wishes of the mother, whether or not it will be harmful for 
her to have a child.  The distinction is not that subtle ? ?102  Kentish told the Court that they had found 
that the Abortion Act was  ‘abused and treated with contempt ? P103 
 ‘tĞůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌ  ?ƚŽƚŚĞŐǇŶĂĞĐŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚůŽŽŵ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌĂƉƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?, 
we compared it with the consultation and we found it quite amazing and shocking that he should write 
this letter on the basis of such a consultation and could indeed sign an abortion form.  We found him 
wanting in good faith. ?104 
The jury were thus invited to consider whether Bloom had properly fulfilled the gatekeeper role 
foreseen for him in the Abortion Act.105 They found in his favour, suggesting that they were not 
convinced of the substantial truth of the allegations against him, but awarded only nominal damages, 
implying little sympathy for him.106   
Bloom both highlights the extent to which the correct interpretation of this provision of the Abortion 
Act was under active dispute in the early years of the Abortion Đƚ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚoffers important 
confirmation of the breadth of discretion that the Act accords to medical gatekeepers.  It also 
demonstrates the significance of medical practice in determining whether a doctor can claim to have 
acted lawfully and, thus, in giving the Act meaning.  The Bloom court accepted this as an essential 
reference point in determining what was required to demonstrate Ă  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ĨĂŝƚŚ ? ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ, with 
detailed evidence offered by expert witnesses for both sides.107 Finally and significantly, Bloom 
illustrates the significant work done to meet the requirements of the Abortion Act in the 1970s.  At 
that time around one third of all psychiatrists believed  W like Bloom  W that abortion should be available 
to any woman who did not wish to continue a pregnancy.108  Even for those who took a permissive 
                                                          
100 Select Committee Evidence, n 52 above, [1348].  A note added by Litchfield and Kentish contended that it 
was not the interview which was abnormal but the conclusions drawn from it, ibid, p 248. 
 
101 Statement of Claim, Bloom, n 52 above, BPAS Miscellaneous 2. 
 
102 Bloom transcript, n 52 above.  Italics in original. 
 




105 Ibid, Summing up, 11, 18. 
 
106 The award of one halfpenny left Bloom liable for an estimated £20,000 in costs that had accrued beyond the 
ƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌŚĂĚƉĂŝĚ ? ?ŝŶƚŽĐŽƵƌƚ ?ŶŽŶ ? ‘^ĞǆĞǆƉĞƌƚǁŝŶƐ ? ? ?ƉĚĂŵĂŐĞƐŽǀĞƌĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶůŝďĞů ?Guardian 
(11 March 1977).   
 
107 Bloom, n 52 above.  See further, Smith, where the CA were critical of the trial judge ?Ɛ failure to permit 
evidence on the practice of other doctors, n 92 above, 384. 
 
108 M Waite,  ‘Consultant Psychiatrists and AďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? WƐǇĐŚŽů DĞĚ  ? ? ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ, by 1971, 35% of 
consultant psychiatrists would recommend termination for any woman who had requested it before ten weeks, 
provided that she had seriously considered alternatives. 
reading of the legislation, however, acting in good faith involved close scrutiny of a woŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ 
for seeking to end a pregnancy and, if approved, the construction of a detailed account of how an 
abortion could be justified, mapped to the terms of the Abortion Act.  At around the same time, a rare 
prosecution for illegal abortion of a doctor who had acted with the necessary second signature 
foreseen in the Abortion Act relied on the fact that he was found not to have acted in good faith, 
having asked virtually no questions regarding ƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ situation nor, indeed, performed basic 
medical tests.109 
While the relevant statutory text at issue has remained unaltered since Bloom, this central aspect of 
how the Act is operationalised within clinical practice has changed significantly since the 1970s.  While 
still stigmatised, abortion services are now entrenched as an essential part of mainstream healthcare, 
with almost all procedures funded by the NHS.110  ůŽŽŵ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨtŚĂƚŽŶĞŵƵƐƚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
right to choose has become widespread within abortion services, with the majority of abortions 
provided by charities operating with an explicitly pro-choice vision; and entrenched in professional 
guidance.111 This is reflected in how the law is interpreted in day-to-day practice.112 tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
experience of accessing services will thus be very different in 2018, notwithstanding the fact that such 
access is governed by exactly the same statutory requirements. 
A focus on the medical gatekeeper role and critical scrutiny of the appropriate exercise of clinical 
discretion was also central to the recent Daily Mail  ‘ƐƚŝŶŐ ?, which strongly echoes some of the 
allegations made in Babies for Burning.  Notably, the Mail also criticises the construction of a narrative 
designed to meet the terms of the Abortion Act. 
 
When a Mail reporter contacted Marie Stopes saying she wanted an abortion, she was told there was 
no need to meet the doctor who would give the go-ahead because it was routine for doctors to fill out 
ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌŵƐ ‘ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐ ? ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƐŚĞŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐ ?ƐĐĂůůĐĞŶƚƌĞƐƚĂĨĨ ? 
 
dŚĞĐĂůůĐĞŶƚƌĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƚŽůĚŚĞƌ P ‘tĞ ?ǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐĚŽŶĞďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ǇŽƵŐĞƚ
ƚŽƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐ ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚĨŽƌĂƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĂŝĚ P ‘/ũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂnt 
ƚŚĞďĂďǇ ? Wwhich, on its own, is not considered sufficient grounds for an abortion under the Act. 
 
ǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞƌŐŽƚƚŽƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐ ?ŚĞƌ ‘/ũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŚĞďĂďǇ ?ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ
ŝŶŚĞƌŵĞĚŝĐĂůŶŽƚĞƐĂƐ ‘ĐůŝĞŶƚŝƐƵŶĂďůĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞǁŝƚŚƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨŝƚƐƚŚĞůĞŐĂů
conditions.113 
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Modern Law Review 283. 
 
113 Faulkner and Smyth, n 23 above.  
 
While the similarities are clear, however, the differences in the findings of the two investigations are 
also stark.  The Bloom interview had taken 30-40 minutes and included more than 90 questions, 
ranging from the subject of <ĞŶƚŝƐŚ ?Ɛ ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ƚŽ ŚĞƌ ĞĂƌůǇ ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ and history of bedwetting.  
Moreover, this was Kentish ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂĚŽĐƚŽƌ PƐŚĞ had already met and discussed 
her situation with the gynaecologist who would perform the abortion.  The Mail investigation claimed, 
however, that MSI ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƐŝŐŶĞĚŽĨĨ QďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶůǇ
ĂďƌŝĞĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂĐĂůůƐƚĂĨĨǁŽƌŬĞƌ ? ?ǁŝƚŚĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌĞŶĚing a 
ƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇůĂƐƚŝŶŐĂƐůŝƚƚůĞĂƐ ‘ũƵƐƚ ? ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚƐ ? ?It further highlighted ƚŚĞY ?Ɛconcerns about doctors 
 ‘ďƵůŬƐŝŐŶŝŶŐ ?ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƐĞŶƚĨŽƌŵƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽŵĞŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĚŽĐƚŽƌsaid to 
have signed 26 forms in two minutes.114   
The Mail reports excited nothing like the attention of Babies for Burning.  They were not widely 
covered by other newspapers and have not resulted in legal or disciplinary investigation into anyone 
involved.  While services were temporarily suspended at MSI clinics following the CQC report noted 
above, this decision was made on the basis of other flaws within the service, which gave concern for 
patient safety.115  This implies a very different understanding of the medical gatekeeper role than that 
seen in Bloom, reflecting a widespread acceptance (in both legal and broader terms) of a far lower 
level of medical scrutiny before a woman is granted access to a legal abortion.  Today, contestation 
rather focuses on whether either of the two certifying doctors must see the woman in person and 
how much time is needed in order to reach a good faith view,116 with the Mail and CQC reports 
suggesting that the bar is now set at a low level. Indeed, ůŽŽŵ ?ƐĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝoning of Kentish might 
appear inappropriately intrusive to modern eyes, in the light of broader acceptance that a married 
woman might seek an abortion simply because she does not want to become a mother, without 
needing to display some underlying neurosis.  
A statute acquires meaning across its life both through judicial determination and through the local, 
interpretative work of those who work within it.  While some doctors immediately took a liberal 
interpretation of the Abortion Act, it took years of individual, daily acts of interpretation for this 
approach to become consolidated into the mainstream orthodoxy that exists today.117  And it is clear 
from the above that the processes of gleaning and interpreting information which underpin the 
decision to authorise an abortion have evolved considerably over the decades.  The result is that this 
ŬĞǇůĞŐĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂ ‘ŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶmeans something very different in the early 1970s and 
in 2018 ?  tŚŝůĞ ůŽŽŵ ?Ɛ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ <ĞŶƚŝƐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďe seen as unnecessary and 
inappropriately intrusive today, the practices described by the Daily Mail would surely have been 
deemed illegal in the 1970s. 
The processes of negotiation and mutual accommodation involved in how an Act is applied and how 
it impacts in practice are always ultimately empirical questions.118 A biographical approach relies upon 
this fundamental socio-legal insight, while foregrounding the need to be attentive to both continuity 
(in the written text and the settling of received interpretations) and change (amendment to the text, 
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evolution or points of rupture in those interpretations).  While the text of the Abortion Act has 
remained largely unaltered since 1967, it has acquired meaning as its terms have been implemented 
and consolidated within day-to-day practice, received understandings of appropriate treatment, the 
policies and procedures of service providers, codes of professional ethics, evolving official guidance 
and regulation.119  While the development of legal doctrine is important, such meaning is developed 
not just by lawyers but also by a range of other actors.  In the present case, reference to contemporary 
medical practice has been an important part of fleshing out that meaning: the Act has both impacted 
on such practice and been read in ways that are influenced by changes within it.  While the liberal 
interpretation which some doctors have given to the Abortion Act has been subject to occasional 
obiter judicial criticism,120 the courts have nonetheless accepted broad clinical discretion in the 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? Ɛ^ŝƌ'ĞŽƌŐĞĂŬĞƌWĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇƉƵƚ ŝƚ P ‘ ?Ŷ ?ŽƚŽŶůǇ
would it be a bold and brave judge who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting 
under the Act, but I think he would really be a foolish judge'.121     
 
3) Continuity and change in broader narratives  
 
ŶĐƚ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ includes not merely developments that flesh out its legal meaning and guide its 
day-to-day implementation.  It also involves the accumulation and entrenchment of, and occasional 
points of rupture in, public narratives reflecting what the law symbolises in broader socio-cultural 
terms.  For example, however convincingly this story was subsequently rebutted, one thing that some 
people  ‘ŬŶŽǁ ? about the Human Rights Act (1998) is that it allows an illegal immigrant to avoid 
deportation if he has a pet cat,122 with this playing to a broader concern that the  Act offers an affront 
to common sense British values and sovereignty.123  Such narratives can enjoy a significant influence, 
despite having no self-evident, direct relationship to the legal meaning of the text of a law as it exists 
 ‘ŽŶ ƚŚĞďŽŽŬƐ ?.124 Notably, what a law comes to symbolise in the popular imagination is crucial in 
shaping opinion regarding the need for its retention, reform or abolition.  As for any human subject, 
these broader narratives form an essential aspect of its story.   
From the first, this symbolic dimension of the Abortion Act was fiercely contested.  Its supporters 
praised it as offering a crucial advance in public health and as a humane, far-sighted piece of 
legislation.125  Its critics, however, attacked it as representing ĂƚƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ‘ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇďĂƐŝƐŽĨ
ŽƵƌ ŵŽƌƚĂů ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?,126 and facilitating ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ƐƋƵĂůŝĚ  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? that had 
                                                          
119 Sheldon, n 112 above, for detailed discussion of this co-evolution. 
 
120 Eg Lord Denning MR, RCN, n 78 above, 554; Cooke J, R v Catt (17 September 2012), [15]. 
 
121 Paton v BPAS [1978] 2 All ER 987, 992 
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123 d^ƚĂŶůĞǇ ? ‘^ĐƌĂƉƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐĐƚwon't Abolish Human Rights ?Telegraph (1 June 2015). 
 
124 Nelken, above n 15. 
 
125 Editorial, n 4 above. 
 
126 Muggeridge, n 5 above. 
 
profiteered at the expense ŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛmisery and offered Ă ‘ǀĞŚŝĐůĞŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŶĐĂŶĞƐĐĂƉĞĨƌŽŵ
ŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?.127  In this light, the two media investigations discussed above were each 
concerned with far wider issues than the actions of those named within them and indelibly marked by 
ongoing struggle regarding the morality of abortion and ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?of the Abortion Act.128     
At their most general, the claims made in Babies for Burning tapped into cultural anxieties regarding 
a changing Britain.  The greater availability of abortion services was part of a broader shift towards 
public acceptance, and greater visibility, of women taking control of their own fertility and planning 
their families,129 facilitating their wider participation in the public sphere.  The fundamental challenge 
which this posed to existing gender and familial norms was fiercely contested: one leading Pro-Life 
MP had attacked the campaign for the Abortion Act as a stampede ŽĨ  ‘ƐŚƌŝůů ĂƚǇƉŝĐĂů ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ
ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƐ ? ŽĨƚĞŶ ĐŚŝůĚůĞƐƐ ? ǁŚŽ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ĨŽƌ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƚƌĂŵƉůĞ ƵƉŽŶ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
ŶĞĞĚƐ ?.130  Others lamented a casualization of attitudes towards the taking of human life and the 
decline in religious norms which this represented.   The veteran journalist, Malcolm Muggeridge 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŝƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚǀŝƚĂůĂŶĚƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŽĨĂůů ? P
 ‘ŝƚŚĞƌǁĞŐŽŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƐŚĂƉŝŶŐŽƵƌŽǁŶĚĞƐƚŝŶǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂŶǇŚŝŐŚĞƌďĞŝŶŐ  
than Man, deciding ourselves how many children shall be born, when and in what varieties, and which 
lives are worth continuing and which should be put out  ? Q ? Or we draw back, seeking to understand 
ĂŶĚĨĂůůŝŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƌƌĞĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨŽƌƵƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ to pursue our own, in true humility praying, as 
ƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĞƌŽĨŽƵƌƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚŽƵƌĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚĂƵŐŚƚƵƐ ?dŚǇǁŝůůďĞĚŽŶĞ ? ?131    
The narratives spun around the Abortion Act have evolved considerably since that time, with faith-
based claims far less prominent in contemporary debates. Fertility control has come to be broadly 
accepted not just as a right but also, increasingly, a responsibility.132 Some strong threads of continuity 
are nonetheless apparent.  Notably, concerns that non-NHS providers may be exploiting women for 
profit and references to a  ‘profit-hungry ?  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ŚĂǀĞůŽŶŐŽƵƚůŝǀĞĚ the concrete examples 
of taxi touts and cash payments ŝŶ ‘ŐƌƵďďǇŶŽƚĞƐ ?which fuelled the imagination of Babies for Burning, 
persisting today in a context where such providers are typically charities operating under NHS 
contract. 
Much more recently, a concern that profit-oriented service providers might influence women in favour 
of termination afforded the context for a statutory amendment, tabled by Nadine Dorries MP.  This 
would have required that women should be offered  ‘independent ? counselling before accessing 
abortion services ? ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?defined to include only statutory bodies and those private 
                                                          
127 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above, 182. 
 
128 For example, for the BPAS Public Relations Officer, BPAS ?Ɛ defamation action was primarily about defending 
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Rubinstein Callingham (5 May 1977), BPAS archive, Evidence 4. 
 
129 The Family Planning Act 1967 made contraception readily available through the NHS. 
 
130 L Abse, Private Member (London: Macdonald 1973) 230. 
 
131 Muggeridge, n 5 above.   
 
132 J Bristow, The Sociology of Generations: New Directions and Challenges (London: Palgrave, 2016), chapter 5. 
 
organisations which had no financial interest in providing abortion services.133  The same concern was 
ĐůĞĂƌŝŶDĂƌŝĂĂƵůĨŝĞůĚDW ?Ɛopposition to a recent Ten Minute Rule Bill seeking the decriminalisation 
of abortion.  Referencing the Mail investigation, Caulfield argued that:  
 
  ‘ƚŚĞh<ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝƐŬŶĞĞ-deep in revelations of unethical, unsafe and unprofessional practices 
 ? Q ? No wonder these abortion providers are calling for a Bill that would get rid of the regulations and 
ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐŝŶƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ?134 
 
In the same way as Babies for Burning, Caulfield here generalises concerns regarding one non-NHS 
service provider to attack an  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?, ignoring the fact that one charity had led the 
campaign for reform,135 whilst criticisms of unsafe and unprofessional practice had related exclusively 
to another.136   
 
While there is thus clear continuity in ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƌŽůĞŝŶĂƉƉƌŽǀŝŶŐĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐ ?there 
are also strong differences in how these are contextualised in 1974 and 2017.  In Babies for Burning, 
criticism of the exercise of clinical discretion is located within a powerful concern that doctors ? failure 
to fulfill the gatekeeper role in the way foreseen in the Abortion Act has resulted in women being 
wrongly accorded access to abortions that they should properly have been denied.  Litchfield and 
Kentish adopted a  ‘shallow cover story ?ŽĨ ‘a childless, utterly selfish, self-seeking and self-indulgent 
married couple who could have no possible reason in the world for qualifying for an abortion under 
the Act ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ  ‘if it was possible for us to buy an abortion  QƚŚĞŶ we had proven beyond all doubt 
that a state of abortion on demand exists in Britain, which is contrary to both the law and the claims 
ŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?137    
In contrast, the Mail report makes no suggestion that women are selfish for seeking abortion nor that 
they should be refused access to services.  Rather it foregrounds ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞĂŶĚ
safety in how those services are offered.138 The main report contains a link to an earlier article 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂĨĞƚǇĨůĂǁƐ ?ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞCQC, which had led to services being temporarily 
suspended at MSI.  It is accompanied by a report from a retired doctor who had worked at MSI and an 
interview with a woman who had been treated there, which each describe flawed consent procedures 
leaving some women unable to voice doubts about their decisions to have an abortion.139  These 
 ‘women protective ? concerns are also visible in Babies for Burning but as abortion on request has 
                                                          
133 Clause 10, amendments 1 and 2, tabled to the Health and Social Care (Re-committed) Bill, HC Deb Vol 532 
Cols 362-91 (7 September 2011).   This would have prevented charitable abortion service providers from 
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134 HC Deb Vol 623 Col 30 (13 March 2017).  
 
135 BPAS, We Trust Women campaign, http://www.wetrustwomen.org.uk/. 
 
136 CQC n 70 above; Faulkner and Smyth, n 23 above. 
 
137 Litchfield and Kentish, n 24 above, 76 
 
138 CQC, n 70 above.   
    
139 :WĂƌƐŽŶƐ ? ‘dŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶConveyor BĞůƚ ?; ^^ŵǇƚŚ ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞLots of Crying Women ... I'd never go through 
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become more widely accepted, at least in early pregnancy, they now offer the dominant frame for 
criticisms of the regulatory regime.140    
One final point is noteworthy regarding DĂƌŝĂĂƵůĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ above: rather than attacking 
ƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐbad practice, a Pro-Life MP here cites the dangers of such practice 
as a reason for defending the  ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚthe Act offers.  ƐŶŽƚĞĚ ?ĂƵůĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ 
intervention was provoked by a Bill seeking to liberalise the law.141  While it is too early to judge, it is 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵĂǇŵĂƌŬĂŶĞǁƐƚĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ?ƐůŝĨĞ story: as it comes to be attacked as 
outdated and redundant by those seeking liberalising reform,142 it may find itself defended, and 
possibly even praised, by Pro-Life commentators. 
Legislation cannot hope to resolve political and ethical disputes but, rather, offers an important site 
upon which they may continue to play out.143  The stories told about the Abortion Act are clearly 
marked by this ongoing struggle, as well as reflecting other contemporary concerns: current debates 
regarding sex selective abortion, for example, focus on particular ethnic communities and are clearly 
refracted through prisms of race and gender.144  Alternatively, narratives may lose force as the broader 
concerns on which they draw fade from memory.  In the 1970s, ĂďŝĞƐĨŽƌƵƌŶŝŶŐ ?Ɛ allegation that a 
doctor would sell aborted fetuses to be made into soap would have echoed powerfully with stories 
which had circulated during both World Wars but are less familiar, and thus almost certainly less 
credible, today.145  However, the current anxieties reflected in the allegations made against MSI are 
strongly rooted in persistent narratives ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ
concern for profit and little regard for women.  The Mail ?Ɛclaim tŚĂƚĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŶŐ
an abortion can be explored in just 22 seconds also speaks powerfully to an ongoing concern that the 
Abortion Act has supported a trivialization of abortion and a casualization of attitudes to human life.146   
 
4) Biography as a window onto the wider world  
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Finally, and briefly, there is no such thing as a life lived in isolation.147  Biography implies the 
exploration of ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝƐŚ ?and alsŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐǁĂŵ ? ?148 offering not just a  ‘character-in-an-
environment ?but also a  ‘character as a way of discovering an environment ? ?149  The biography of a 
statute should offer not just study of how its meaning is influenced by broader changes in the contexts 
within which it operates but also an important window onto the world around it, permitting a tightly 
focused study of any one of the evolving contexts that have impacted on spatial and temporal 
variation in its interpretation and implementation.  
 
In spatial terms, divergent interpretations of the Abortion Act in different areas permits an exploration 
of the (waning) influence of local, senior doctors in different regions and changing mechanisms of NHS 
funding on service provision.150  At a national level, the differential impact of the Abortion Act in 
Scotland, as compared to England and Wales, speaks to wider differences in the legal context within 
which it operates,151 the different history of service provision in the different countries which make 
up the UK, and the key roles played by individuals in how a statute is implemented.152   Notably, the 
fact that abortion services were accommodated within NHS facilities has meant that private and 
charitable providers were not established in Scotland in response to gaps in provision and concerns 
regarding the development of aŶ ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?did not bite in the same way.153  The fact that the 
Abortion Act does not extend to Northern Ireland offers a window onto the powerful influence of 
religion in that jurisdiction, the particularities of the political context, matters of national identity, and 
the parameters of devolution.154   The Abortion Act has also been an important focus in ongoing 
dispute regarding how law should  W or should not  W be reformed in both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland,155 and this is an important part of its story. 
 
A biography of the Abortion Act can also offer a window onto a range of significant changes across 
time.156  First, the broad meaning ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ďĞ  ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚ ďǇ Ă
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ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?reflected technological developments that had moved abortion out 
of the operating theatre, making it a far safer, technically less demanding procedure.157  An analysis 
of the interpretation and implementation of this provision of the Abortion Act might also offer an 
insight into health professionals ? changing roles within the interdisciplinary medical team, with RCN 
revealing the dominance of medicine over nursing and midwifery in the early 1980s.158 For Lord 
Denning, a restrictive interpretation of the Act was necessary to protect nurses,  ‘young women who 
are dedicated by their profession and training to do all they can to preserve life ? from  ‘soul-destroying ?
work, by requiring those doctors minded to prescribe abortions to perform them themselves.159  The 
contrary interpretation, adopted by a slim majority in the House of Lords, relied on the view that the 
ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ ůĞŐĂůůǇ ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ the doctors, representing ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ĂƐ ůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?
 ‘ŚĂŶĚŵĂŝĚĞŶƐ ? ?160 Each view stands in stark contrast to a far less hierarchical, contemporary view that 
the different professions each bring discrete competences to a multidisciplinary  ‘team ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?.161  
Secondly, today ůŽŽŵ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ Wthat abortion should be available to any woman who wants one  W has 
become a widespread orthodoxy within modern British abortion services, at least in the context of 
early pregnancy.162  The dominance of the corresponding, permissive interpretation of the Abortion 
Act may be read as reflecting broader shifts in jurisprudence and professional ethics, which have each 
moved away from an acceptance of paternalism  ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĚƵƚǇŽĨďĞŶĞĨŝĐĞŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐthe 
patient might justify his or her primary responsibility for important decisions) towards a strong 
foregrounding of the need to respect patient autonomy.163  Changes in the application of the Act might 
also reflect a growing public acceptance of ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚs to control their own fertility and the 
consequent ŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ.  In this sense, the 
story of the Abortion Act can offer a window into broader shifts in understandings of gender roles and 
patterns of childrearing.  Finally, it also offers a powerful illustration of the declining power of religious 
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Health Regulation and the Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1992), 141.  
 
159 RCN, n 78 above, at 555, 557.   
 
160 Montgomery, n 159 above. 
 
161 Lady Hale has read RCN to mean tŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŝƐŵĞƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝƐ ‘ĂƚĞĂŵĞĨĨŽƌƚ
ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚƵŶĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌperforming those tasks that are reserved to a doctor 
and the nurses and others carrying out those tasks which they are qualified to perform ?.  Doogan, n 78 above, 
[9].  
 
162 E.g. RCGP, n 111 above.   
 
163 Generally Sheldon, n 112 above.   
 
norms and the growing prevalence of the view castigated above, that people might  ‘ƐŚĂƉ ?Ğ ?ŽƵƌŽǁŶ
destiny without reference to any higher being ƚŚĂŶDĂŶ ? ?164  
Conclusion 
 
If biographical information regarding an object inheres in the patina of age, wear and repair acquired 
through its life,165 then for a statute it is to be found in amendments made to its text; legal doctrine 
giving meaning to its provisions; practices which it influences and which may, in turn, influence its 
interpretation; its impact in the physical world; and the shifting symbolic meanings that it acquires 
across time and space.  The idea of biography offers a shorthand for an approach which requires 
simultaneous attention to both continuity and change in these aspects of ĂůĂǁ ?Ɛ life.  It takes seriously 
the insight that written norms are rooted in the past, enshrining a specific set of historically contingent 
values and practices, yet that  W as linguistic structures which can impact on the world only through 
acts of interpretation  W they are simultaneously constantly evolving.166 It acknowledges the complex, 
ongoing co-constitution of law and the contexts within which it operates, recognising that 
understanding how law works requires historical, empirical study. Finally, it suggests that 
consideration of a law can offer a unique window through which to explore these broader contexts, 
serving as  ‘a thread of continuity through changing times ? ?167 
 
Taken individually, each of these insights is likely, to a greater or lesser extent, already to be familiar 
to both socio-legal scholars and legal historians.  Earlier work has described the historical 
circumstances which gave rise to the passage of specific statutes;168 emphasised how individual cases 
must be understood within a broader historical context;169 explored the legal impact of persistence or 
shifts in such contexts;170 discussed how the meaning of a specific legal concept can evolve across 
time;171 analysed how understandings of law and legality are refracted through broader cultural 
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anxieties at particular times;172 considered how legal reasoning relies on rhetorical strategies likely to 
prove persuasive to concrete audiences within specific historical, cultural and political contexts;173 
described how an  ‘inherited regulatory environment ? informs the interpretation and implementation 
of any law;174 and discussed what socio-legal scholars might learn from legal history.175  However, the 
approach proposed here combines these insights in ways which are either new or, at least, uncommon 
in existing socio-legal scholarship, with bŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?Ɛ simultaneous attention to change and continuity 
over an extended period offering the potential for a richer and more nuanced appreciation of law.  
While we must leave it to others to explore what insights might be gleaned in the study of other 
specific laws, we have suggested that this approach has much to contribute to understanding the 
Abortion Act (1967), a statute which has exhibited considerable longevity in an evolving, highly 
controversial field.  
 
Any way of seeing is, of course, also a way of not seeing, with any given approach bound to reveal only 
those aspects of law that are possible for it to fathom through the assumptions, protocols and 
methods of its own knowledge-practices.176  One implication of a biographical approach is that, by its 
nature, it foregrounds the study of one particular law rather than aiming to provide a comprehensive 
account of the regulatory field, which  W in the context of abortion services  W would involve mapping 
an extremely complex and constantly shifting legal landscape.177  An inherent risk of a biographical 
approach to law might thus echo that sometimes made of human biography: in focusing on one life, 
it is liable to miss the broad sweep of history, giving too much weight to individual impact divorced 
from the broader behaviour of groups.178  Secondly, and seemingly against the grain of much socio-
legal scholarship, in starting from the study of a particular statute ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
experience, a biographical approach might be criticised for appearing to offer Ă ‘ůĂǁ-ĨŝƌƐƚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ.179  
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179 P Ewick and S Silbey The Common Place of Law (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 20, ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞƚŚĞ ‘ůĂǁ-ĨŝƌƐƚ ? 
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A third, somewhat contradictory concern, which may begin to respond to the first two, is that the 
boundary between  ‘fish ? and  ‘stream ? is always and inevitably unclear in the context of the biography 
of a law.180  In other words, any study purporting to be focused on a specific statute risks collapsing 
into a broader study of the regulatory field, the behaviour of the individuals who operate within it, 
and beyond that, the shifting environment within which law operates.  In this sense  W and here is our 
response to the first concerns  W while it focuses on a particular law, the biographical approach seeks 
to capture how law, day-to-day practices and popular understandings develop through a process of 
ongoing, mutual constitution, with formal legal agents just one subset of the wider range of individuals 
actively involved in law-making.181  Indeed a study, such as our own, which traces change and 
continuity across time is inevitably concerned precisely with exploring such co-constitution.182  And to 
return to the issue of the boundary between fish and stream: this is a familiar problem for socio-legal 
scholars, who are used to dealing with the messiness of law and the difficulty of defining the 
boundaries of  ‘the legal ? ?183  We thus recognise this as an important issue of which all socio-legal 
scholars must remain aware, rather than admitting it as a specific methodological problem for the 
biographical approach.  
In defending human biography from the charge that it is liable to miss the broad sweep of history, one 
eminent historian and biographer has written:  
 ‘ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝƐůŝŬĞĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐĂĚĞĞƉĐĂǀĞƌŶ ?dŚĞĐĂǀĞƌŶŝƐĂŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ?ƚŚĞǁĂůůƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĂǀĞƌŶ
are the evidence.  From the lie of the land, you can tell that the cavern is likely to be an interesting one.  
ƵƚƵŶƚŝůǇŽƵůŝŐŚƚǇŽƵƌůĂŵƉĂŶĚĐƌĂǁůĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǇŽƵǁŝůůĨŝŶĚ ?zŽƵǁŝůůŶĞǀĞƌŐĞƚ
the whole picture; there will always be crevices out of reach.  But the project is finite, and when your 
exploration is finished you will have, not only a unique appreciation of the particular cave, but a better 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐĨŽƌŐĞŽůŽŐǇŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ?184   
Similarly, the biography of one important statute can offer a unique appreciation of the operation of 
that one law and a narrow focus for analysing important trends in the broad sweep of history 
throughout its duration, as well as casting broader light on the way in which any law acquires meaning 
over its lifetime.  A biographical approach cannot hope to resolve the ŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞƐƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨůĂǁ 
and nor should it; it can, however, add to a full appreciation of its complexity.   
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